How to bring down the ‘last European dictator’: the European Union and its strategy towards Belarus

‘The ENP [European Neighbourhood Policy] strategy paper states that under the present situation in the country – which is by all means deteriorating – it is not yet possible to offer the full benefits of the ENP to Belarus.’ The ENP is developed to strengthen ‘stability, security and well-being for all concerned, and hence prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours.’ It is not as ambitious as to aim at instant democratisation of the neighbouring countries of the European Union. However, a will to evolve in a liberal-democratic direction is required for participation, since cooperation should be ‘based on common values.’ With Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine intensive cooperation within the ENP-framework is already in the making. Only Libya and Belarus do not fulfil the basic requirements to start negotiations. Alternative policies are tailored to the situations in these autocracies.

Inconvenience

The aforementioned quote from the Country Strategy Paper: Belarus 2005-2006 of the European Commission holds an interesting paradox: although the situation is worsening the Commission does not shun the use of the word ‘yet’, as though the absence of a ‘democratic, stable, reliable and increasingly prosperous partner’, which it desires Belarus to be, is only a temporary inconvenience. I do not think the European Union suffers from Fukuyaman delusions (that liberal democracy would never be challenged again ideologically) and regards Belarus’ state form only as a delay before the inevitable transition takes place. The European Commission would not call Lukashenko ‘the last European dictator’, as some journalists do, a pronouncement which presumes a divine knowledge of the future political situation in both Belarus and the rest of Europe.

Hopes

I do believe, however, the Commission has high hopes to change the autocratic rule of president Aleksander Lukashenko. Perhaps rather too high, as the available instruments fall well short of promising any short term results. The financial resources assigned to this cause remain meagre, although they have recently been raised from 10 to 12 million euro annually. Most importantly, a whole range of determining factors is beyond the reach of EU influence. The external manipulability of the political system of Belarus is therefore limited.

Tradition

The Belarusians have little experience with democracy or related liberties. Their nationhood, it is popular believed, owes its cultural development to the Soviets. Its integration in the Soviet Union has modernised and successfully industrialised the country. Apart from the Baltic republics, the Belarusian was the wealthiest of the Soviet Republics. Comparable to the Central Asian republics only, there was little support for popular initiatives when Perestroika and Glasnost policies made these possible. Several critical publications during this period, on topics like the dubious role of the Red Army in Belarusian history or the handling of the Chernobyl disaster, had little influence on public opinion.

Workers’ paradise

Belarus was a well-disciplined ‘workers’ paradise’, where people were well secure of the consumer goods they needed and often opposed the ways of the West. The only period of severe recession between 1991 and 1994 coincided with the government of moderate (ex-)communists who cautiously improved relations with the European Union and half-heartedly carried out some economic reforms. Afterwards, the economy performed better than most post-communist economies. The Russian economy, which reformed in a much faster pace towards ‘robber capitalism’, was a deterring example. Therefore, political and economic liberalisation was and still is not very appealing to the people of Belarus.

Circumspect

The dictatorship is not an imminent problem for the people. Although daily life is not easy, Belarusians enjoy a certain level of prosperity. Repression is circumspect; there are no random arrests or massive bloodsheds. Activists for more democracy are harassed by administrative red tape, seemingly incidentally victims of crime and ultimately arrested and prosecuted on mostly unrelated charges. Only seldom do opponents of the regime ‘disappear’.

Opposition

The political opposition consists of two main groups: convicted democrats on the one hand, former communist and authoritarian functionaries on the other. The first group has alienated itself from the public with its one-time virulent russophobia. Due to state-control of mass media, there is hardly any chance for their leaders to become well-known.

Threatening

The second group is a little more threatening, although their natural following might find no reason to be disloyal to the president, as long as their living conditions are stable. High profile politicians who fall into disgrace are often damaged by smear-campaigns. All of the opposition is seriously divided into parties and factions, between which even experts can hardly tell the difference. Most of these groups have hardly any following. Moreover, the methods of the opposition do not always meet European standards: they rigged their alternative presidential elections to decrease Lukashenko’s share. Unification and training of the opposition is an ongoing project of the European Union.

Economic pressure

The economy is usually regarded as the main means of pressure in European foreign policy. Ideally, antagonising the European Union amounts to risking economic countermeasures almost as powerful as military action. In the case of Belarus, the reality is more complex than that. Firstly, its foremost trading partner is Russia. The eastward orientation of the economy never changed, while reforms never got that far on the way. Thus, Belarusian depressions start in Moscow, whether it is in the Kremlin or on the market.

Ambassadors

Secondly, the people gaining from European trade are often either very small traders who drive to and from EU member states or private entrepreneurs. The first group could well be a major ‘ambassador’ of the European Union in Belarus, as these small traders have more knowledge of the ‘Western way of life’ and the European Union’s wealth than the majority of the population. They might spread dissatisfaction with the current conditions. The other group is potentially a driving force behind democratic transition. Private ownership and economic independence often inspire people to demand a say in state-affairs. Unfortunately, most of the economy is controlled by the state. Given the uncertain legal situation, the European Union is hardly in a position to increase the market share. Nonetheless, it does provide credit to small entrepreneurs through the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

Civil Society

The nurturing of ‘Civil Society’ is another main asset of the European Union’s strategy. ‘Civil Society’, easily overestimated as the panacea against authoritarian regimes, comes down in practice to a section of associational life, consisting of interest groups and groups with a social or humanitarian objective. The first problem is to select the functioning organisations, as some groups have hardly any supporters and do not have the trust of the public.

Harassment

The second problem is the constant harassment of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) by the government. They have to meet complex requirements, and forced discontinuation due to ‘technical reasons’ looms constantly. Assistance from the EU support programmes is hampered by complex and often-changing administrative rules. Nonetheless, a vibrant associational life is established, partly as a result of EU assistance. At the same time, overly political NGOs are closed down and the regime is not really threatened apparently. Maybe ‘Civil Society’ could be a stabilising force, once the process of democratisation is initialised.

Mass media

Both opposition politicians and NGOs suffer from state control over the mass media. Over the last ten years, independent newspapers, and television and radio stations have been seized or closed down by the state. The amateurism of state television made the people take refuge at Russian channels. These channels had a somewhat fresher outlook on Belarus and dared to pose some critical questions. In times of elections they were always on the side of Lukashenko however and did not give airtime to members of the opposition.

Embryonic

The European Union appreciates the problem and is now investing in a radio station, broadcasting from its own territory. The sponsoring of media is – surprisingly - still in an embryonic stage. Access to other than state media could be very helpful to the emergence of rival candidates in the next presidential elections.

Training

Apart from the attempts to influence society and the economy, there are some assistance projects aimed at members and parts of the government apparatus. Educational cooperation is probably the least suspect of these projects. However, critical professors and students have serious problems with their academic careers. Propaganda has in some cases, especially in the study of history, intermingled with academic research.

Border guards

Training of border guards, which is also part of EU assistance, is even trickier. Of course, the training is directed at correctly securing the borders. These guards serve a regime however that has never distanced itself from the Soviet tradition of forcibly keeping people in their country or region. The use of the training of officials can be helpful in streamlining bureaucracy and making civil servants more citizen-oriented. However, this has the disadvantage generally that the European Union is thus strengthening a part of a repressive body. Therefore, Belarus is ruled out from many programmes that ENP partners can join.

Banned

Contact and cooperation has been limited since 1997 to exclude those officials that are suspected of violating human rights or of being responsible for the forging of elections. Thus, the European Union and other democratic countries punished the Belarusian regime. Lukashenko himself is also banned from entering the European Union. Although this presumably bothers him, he is not ‘yet’ afraid to lose his dictatorial powers due to the EU democratisation policy.

The last dictator?

The external manipulability of the political systems for now remains small, as tradition, the political playing field and even the mass media are on Lukashenko’s side. Thus far, ‘Civil Society’ does not threaten him and the economic situation is not dependent on the European Union. The European Union could either regard the democratisation of Belarus as a long-term goal or intensify its attempts. Lukashenko is not likely to change his ways because of the temptation of the ENP. As the system is based on the president and has no strong institutional or ideological basis, Lukashenko’s successor does not have to be a dictator.

Luuk van der Meer, Zwolle, the Netherlands