Tackling distrust in the EU, the basis of euroscepticism in Croatia

Just as in some other European countries (e.g. the referendums on the European Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005), there is a gap between the political elite and the citizens of Croatia with regard to the popularity of the European integration process. While there is hardly any euroscepticism amongst the political elite of Croatia, research points out that the public opinion on European integration has changed in the last few years from supportive to more sceptical. In 'Euroscepticism in Croatia: On the far side of rationality?' Aleksander Štulhofer describes his research on the main characteristics of popular (of the people) euroscepticism in Croatia and gives some recommendations on how to tackle this.

Štulhofer distinguishes theoretical (lack of trust in the EU) from practical (refusal to join the EU) euroscepticism. Although it might seems that these two are cause-and-effect, this is not the case. While the lack of trust in the EU has been relatively stable over the years (Štulhofer mentions that 54 % of the population feels distrust towards the EU), the idea that it is better not to join the EU is on the rise (from a mere 25% in 2003 to more than 50 % in 2005). The explanation for this is that the initial belief that ´becoming a member of the EU will result in a rapid increase in the standard of living´, dissolved quickly in the countries that joined the EU in 2004. The fear of rising prices, on the other hand, takes over.

Who are these eurosceptic citizens? From Štulhofer´s research it turns out that it is impossible to draw a social or demographic profile of eurosceptics in Croatia. There is a small tendency that older, less educated people are inclined to reject EU membership sooner, but in contrast to the expectations, these are only minor differences. The failure of determining popular euroscepticism by demography and social factors suggests that eurosceptic motives are irrational. This is only partly true. Research shows that symbolic values influence euroscepticism. People are afraid to loose their national identity, culture, history or religion when becoming member of the European Union. This xenophobic traditional perception is often based on myths and is known as exclusive nationalism.

However, the second process that influences euroscepticism, is not irrational. Štulhofer introduces the 'proxy mechanism': because the citizens do not have sufficient experience with or knowledge of EU institutions, they have to base their opinion and trust on something else. Since they do know and have experience with local and national institutions, the degree of trust in these institutions reflects the degree of trust in EU institutions. So citizens base their trust in the EU on the local and national political institutions they do know.

Finally, Štulhofer concludes the chapter with three concrete recommendations how to increase trust in national and EU institutions:

  1. Continued provision of information about the European Union, the integration process and the course of the negotiations. To ensure trust in the EU institutions and acceptance of the EU idea, citizens need to feel and be involved in the integration process. This can be realised by better informing the citizens about actual costs and symbolic and material benefits of EU membership;
  2. Implementation of measures that increase trust in national institutions. To win back the trust of the people in national institutions it is important to combat corruption among civil servants. Measures need to be taken to increase professionalism, effectiveness and transparency. At the same time sanctions need to be imposed on government employees who break the law. The increase of trust in national institutions will automatically lead to a decrease of distrust in EU institutions, according to the proxy mechanism explained above;
  3. Creating counterbalance to exclusive nationalism. There are two main aspects in this recommendation. Firstly, if the citizens benefit economically from EU integration, there is less reason to turn to the irrational symbolic tool of exclusive nationalism. To achieve this, structural reforms need to be implemented, which will increase competitiveness of the Croatian economy, restructure social services, and improve local and national governance. The second aspect, the reform of the cultural policy, is part of this process as well. A new national cultural policy will lead to an open understanding of national identity, which adapts easily to changes (e.g. European integration) without fear of losing this national identity. Enlightened patriotism will replace the traditional, xenophobic and conservative exclusive nationalism.

This article is a summary of 'Euroscepticism in Croatia: On the far side of rationality?' by Aleksander Štulhofer from the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Zagreb. The full text of the article is available at: http://www.ijf.hr/eng/EU4/stulhofer.pdf.

Suzanne Jansen, IPP (Dutch Centre for Political Participation)

This article was published in Politeia Newsletter 46 - October 2007

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