Early warning: Populism in the New Member States

Political populism is on the rise. Traditional divisions between left-wing and right-wing parties grow increasingly blurred, and in their stead the division between the people and the political elites becomes ever more important for the understanding of political dynamics. These processes are particularly visible in some of the new Eastern European member states, like Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovakia, where the parties born in the first ten years of the transition period gradually give way to new-comers, who put personal charisma, nationalistic vigour, and anti-corruption rhetoric in the place of traditional party programmes and ideologies. Is this development dangerous, and if so, which aspects of liberal democracy will be most affected by it?

Causes of populism

On the international front, globalisation significantly diminishes room for manoeuvring for national political majorities both in terms of economic policies and foreign relations. On the domestic front, political majorities are subject to ever more intense competition from other centres of power: autonomous central banks, powerful constitutional courts, independent judiciaries and public servants. Overall, this specific combination of international and domestic factors has lead to the diminishing of the powers of politically elected bodies. Domestic political bodies, generally, could make less difference in the contemporary world, than they could previously do.

However, citizens’ expectations about what their governments could do are not proportionally decreasing, as one might expect. This is the second fundamental source of the populist condition. Societies – from Africa to Eastern Europe – have formed the belief that governance does matter, and that improvements in the patterns of governance can make a substantial difference in terms of overall social welfare.

The combined result of the two sources of populism is the construction of political majorities permanently dissatisfied with the performance of political elites. These majorities are a fertile ground for the growth of populist movements.

Effects

Radicalisation of politics: Political new-comers tend to adopt radical agenda, especially vis-à-vis the rule of law. They challenge not only specific policies of the mainstream parties, but the normative, juridical “shackles” on political will and decision making altogether. Therefore, often populist movements campaign against external conditionality and engagements of the state, as well as against domestic competitors of political majorities, such as independent agencies, constitutional courts, central banks, etc.

Politicisation of the judiciary: Mainstream parties have willingly passed an increasing number of difficult political decisions to the judiciary in sensitive areas such as privatisation, restitution, the legacy of the communist past, etc. Hidden behind the authority of international or constitutional rules, domestic elites are often willing to avoid taking responsibility for sensitive and unpopular decisions. The judiciary itself has been active in taking the opportunity to block unpopular policies of governments on the basis of legal rules and principles. These two symmetrical processes have lead to intense politicization and expansion of judicial power.

Self-entrenchment of the established parties: An undesirable effect of populism on the rule of law is the tendency of mainstream parties to restrict competition by new-comers through constitutional and quasi-constitutional mechanisms. This leads to the politicisation of the constitution itself, and to the blurring of the line between routine and constitutional questions. Ultimately, this leads to the undermining of constitutionalism – the idea that there is a set of basic rules, which are not questioned in the course of normal politics.

Cartelisation of mainstream parties is a process, which is familiar to students of contemporary democracy. The political insecurity for established elites, which populism causes, may intensify the tendencies among established parties to form cartels with the aim to block political competition. Helped by the judiciary, mainstream parties may actually turn the constitution into an instrument for the perpetuation of their staying in power.

Taking politics beyond the scope of the rule of law: The mainstream parties might themselves become a populist threat to the rule of law by: a) adopting some of the policies advocated by radical populists; b) advocating the opening up of new areas of political decision making, which are not subject to the rule of law.

Examples showing that mainstream parties do adopt policies advocated by populist and even extremist parties are not difficult to find. The whole issue of immigration, it seems, was first brought up to the political arena by populist parties. Further, the calls for “law and order”, tough measures against crime, and the fight against corruption are also such topics. All of them have the potential to be turned into threats to the rule of law, either by the introduction of rules violating individual rights and the separation of powers, or simply by the introduction of rules which have no effect, or are consistently disregarded.

Further, mainstream parties and radical populists alike may seek to open up and create political platforms and spheres exempt from the constraints of the rule of law. Emergency circumstances, as the war against terrorism for instance, help create an atmosphere in which this is possible.

How serious is the danger?

This question is yet to be answered. It is possible to believe that the current rise of populism in Eastern Europe is just a temporary aberration on the road to normal “European” party politics. An alternative explanation is that there is a process – transcending Eastern Europe - of profound political transformation. Traditional programmatic parties gradually give way to new, situational political players. In this new brave world of populist politics there is no need for coherent party platforms and stable loyalties: political parties become by-products of media regulation and the rules of political financing. These by-products are easily dispensable, since the cost of setting up a new one becomes relatively lower.

If the second interpretation is valid, the phenomenon of rising populism, its causes, and its impact will attract more and more attention.

Dr. Daniel Smilov, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, Bulgaria