WEBSITES & EVENTS

VoteMatch in Bulgaria: ‘Glasovoditel’ and the Bulgarian general elections of 2005

In anticipation of the 2005 elections, and inspired by the positive experience of the Dutch StemWijzer, the European VoteMatch and the German Wahl-O-Mat, the Centre for Liberal Strategies (CLS) decided to implement a web-based test for political positions in Bulgaria.

Reasons

There were two reasons for this decision. First, after fifteen years of transition and four elections under the 1991 constitution, the Bulgarian democracy seemed consolidated enough to offer a fairly rational structure of choices, though this is hidden from view sometimes by the idiosyncrasies of the Bulgarian political system. Second, for the first time the Bulgarian public was not facing a dramatic decision about the general direction of the country, nor was its imagination captured by a charismatic leader. So there appeared to be a growing proportion of potential voters in Bulgaria who were prepared to base their vote on rational examination of party programs, positions, and policy proposals.

Votemap

The CLS saw the VoteMatch as an excellent tool for enhancing the trend towards a more rational voting behaviour, and preparations started to provide the Bulgarian public with this tool in time for the elections. In doing this, the CLS was greatly aided by the Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek, the Dutch organisation which originally developed the tool and generously and readily offered its methodological, logistical and moral support. After some deliberation, we decided to name the Bulgarian tool ‘Glasovoditel’, which combines the notions of ‘vote’ and ‘roadmap’ and can be best translated as a ‘votemap’.

One two three

As any test based on the VoteMatch, Glasovoditel had to develop in three main directions. First, the test consisting of 25-30 statements needed to be prepared. Second, the test needed to be made available on the Internet. Third, the Bulgarian public needed to be made aware of its existence and to become interested to use it.

Peculiarities

In pursuing these ends, the CLS gathered a team of prominent political scientists and sociologists, who identified cleavages between the major political parties on the basis of their platforms and selected the issues of greatest public interest. A list of 25 statements was prepared, ranging from breakfast for schoolchildren to tax on dividends, and from the obligatory doctor’s fee per visit to the archives of the pre-1989 State Security. The process of generating a long and short list of statements revealed several peculiarities of the Bulgarian situation. One was that issues, which all members of the team originally believed to be relevant, had to be dropped due to the lack of cleavage. These included the presence of Bulgarian troops in Iraq (in their pre-election platforms all major parties wanted Bulgaria to withdraw as soon as possible) and Bulgaria’s position on the Brussels-demanded early closure of two old nuclear reactors (none of the parties approved the closure, but all were completely dovish on bringing this point to Brussels). Also, the reformist and legislative pull of Bulgaria’s pursuit of EU membership in 2007 meant a high level of consensus among parties on almost all issues related to the acquis communautaire. At the same time, possibly reflecting the fact that Bulgaria is among the poorest European countries, economic cleavages were easy to identify, and they entered the final list of statements in large numbers.

Launch

Glasovoditel also progressed on the web and in the media. One of the most prominent Internet providers in the country hosted the website and ensured the smooth running of all logistics. Media became strongly interested and were a major channel for popularising, explaining and analysing Glasovoditel. This included especially the major media partners – Bulgarian National TV, and Dnevnik daily. As a launch of Glasovoditel, Bulgarian National TV made three prime-time broadcasts with leading politicians – a running Deputy Prime Minister and leaders or deputy leaders of all major parties – filling the test live and discussing their choice of positions. Dnevnik daily started a series of analytical articles for each of the 25 statements in the test, presenting pros and cons and defending certain positions. Other media covered the Glasovoditel, and Internet forums were rich in responses and discussions.

Secret leftists

The most common response was one of surprise – many people who did the test found themselves being closer to the leftist Socialist party, while their prior expectation and electoral mood was a rightist one. The most ready explanation for this phenomenon is the fact (already previously noted by researchers) that even though many Bulgarians sympathise and vote for rightist and centrist parties, their attitudes and opinions on economic issues are quite leftist. Obviously, the Bulgarian political space is still restructuring.

Results

Eventually, at the elections on June 25, 2005, the final results indicated more than 26,000 realisations of the test. For a country with a population of less than 8 million and very modest Internet penetration (far less than 10 % of the population uses the Internet actively), this number can be considered as a very good achievement and as a promise for future implementation of the tool in Bulgaria.

Georgy Ganev, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

http://glasovoditel.online.bg